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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAUS
SAUT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee.
vs.
CARLOS HERNANDEZ. Case No. 20000293-CA
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I. The Statements Admitted at Trial Were Not Excited Utterances and
Were Inadmissable Against Mr. Hernandez.
A. The Statements Were Admitted with No Evidence of an Exciting
Event.
Lor Mrs. Hernandez's statements to be admissible, the Appellee must have shown
that a "startling event or condition occurred." West Valley City v. Hutto. 5 P.3d U 5
(L'tah App. 2000). A review of the record does not support the conclusion that a
sufficiently startling event occun-ed to ultimateK' overwhelm Mrs. Hernandez's abilitv to
reflect and respond to the Officer's questions. At the time the trial court detennined that a
startling event occurred there was insufficient evidence to support that ruling.
The trial court made its ruling after James Salazar's testimony and after part of
Officer's Wind's testimony. R. 125, At that time, the only evidence before the court was
the testimony provided up until that time. While Appellee asserts that the trial court had
photographic evidence of an injury, See Brief of Appellee at 8, the record shows that the
photographs were not admitted until after the alleged excited utterances. R. 126.
Thus, the evidence of a startling event must arise from young Mr. Salazar's
testimony, or that portion of Officer's Wind's testimony preceding the trial court's ruling.
Mr. Salazar indicated that Mr. Hernandez called to him calmly and had to do so twice. R.
121. He further indicated that he never saw any violence between his parents and
explained that he only called the police out of concern lor possible violence. R. 121-22.
Officer Wind's testimony indicated that: Mrs. Heniandez was "quite upset," R. 123; there
were "signs, you know, makeup" of crying though she wasn't at the time. Id.; her voice
was "excited, but not out of control," R. 124; and that Mrs. Hernandez had, "a little mark
the size of the tip of a pen, on, on her thigh." R. 125.
The trial judge ruled that an exciting event occurred based solely on Officer Wind's
statements that Mrs. Hernandez was, "upset initially," and, "even though she wasn't
cr>'i»g at present she might have been crying." R. 125. There appears to be little basis to
support this ruling in the record. Simply because someone "might have been crying" at
some earlier time and their voice, while speaking to an officer, was "excited," does not
mean a startling event has occurred. The declarant's demeanor must be such that it "stills
the capacity of reflection." Hutto. 5 P.3d at 4. While there was evidence of a "mark" on
Mrs. Ilemandez's leg, there was no evidence on the record that the mark was an injury. In
fact, from the trial judge's ruling, it does not even appear he considered the mark on Mrs.
Hernandez's leg relevant. R. 125.
2
Nothing on the record at the time of the trial judge's ruling supports the notion that
a sufficiently startling event occurred to overwhelm Mrs. Hernandez's ability to reflect.
The possibility" of a few, long ago dried tears, and a nervous or excited voice do not offer
sufficient evidence to rule as the trial court did. This Court should act to correct the trial
judge's abuse of discretion and overrule the lower court's decision.
B. The Statements Were Not the Product of a Startling Event.
Statements made from the comfort of one's home and in response to an
investigating officer rarely, if ever, qualify as excited utterances. See Hutto 5 P.3d 1. 6.
n.7. Hutto requires a review of the declarant's age. the lapse of time, the nature of the
event and apparent intensity of the reaction to the event, the need or lack of
hospitalization, the declarant's familiarity with their surroundings, and whether the
statement was a spontaneous outburst or a response to a question. Id. at 5. Here, the
alleged statements were made by an adult with a mark on her leg, from her own home
while responding to an officer's questions and thus, were not admissible as excited
utterances.
Appellee would have this Court believe Officer Wind testified that Mrs. Hernandez
came running from her house decrying her husband; the officer simply asked what
happened: and she immediately responded that Mr. Hernandez had stabbed her in the leg.
Appellee asserts that Officer Wind testified that as he approached Mrs. Hernandez she
"blurted out that she wanted "no part of her husband anymore,' or words to that effect."
Brief of Appellee at 7. Appellee further asserts that Officer Wind simply responded to
this statement by asking what happened. At this point Appellee asserts that Officer Wind
testified that Mrs. Hernandez "then told him that her husband grabbed a pen out of her
hand and had stabbed her in the leg with it." Id. at 8.
On reviewing the record it is clear that Officer Wind made no such claims In fact
his testimony clearly indicates that he approached the residence to find Mrs. Heniandez
and her son. (not Mr. Hernandez as Appellee asserts) in the home. Officer Wind testified
that Mrs. Hernandez "met him at the front door." R. 124. At some point unclear from the
record. Mrs. Hernandez allegedly "stated," (not blurted) she wanted no part of her
husband anymore. In response to a question about Mrs. Hernandez's demeanor. Officer
Wind responded, "she stated to me [what] had happened, she wanted no part of her
husband anymore." R. 124. Nowhere in the record does it indicate when Mrs. I lernandez
allegedly made this statement or whether in fact it was a response to the Officer's
questions. Ivven assuming this statement was a spontaneous "blurting out", it, standing by
itself, does not support the inference that Mr. Heniandez assaulted Mrs. Heniandez.
Officer Wind further testified:
I just basically asked her what happened that afternoon. She took me
to the back master or bedroom where all 3 individuals were in at the
time. She said they were arguing over filling out job applications for
the defendant. He became angry with her, a little shouting match
back and, back and forth, and grabbed the pen out of her hand and
stabbed her in her leg with it.
R. 126. Hutto requires the trial court to carefully determine which, if any of these alleged
statements were excited utterances and admit only those few statements that qualify. See
Hutto. at 4. & 4. n.4.
Here, because the statements were made in response to Officer Wind's questioning
and Mrs. Hernandez was in her home, the statements were presumptively inadmissable
and there was no evidence on record to overcome that presumption. See id. at 6. n.7.
Mrs. Heniandez. a competent adult with little or no sign of injury, met Officer Wind at
the door. Appellant was not in the home as Appellee claims. Thus, even assuming Mrs.
Heniandez feared her husband {not at all clear from the record), he was not present to
make her nervous. She responded to the officer's question in an excited, not out of
control, manner. tc[NJot every statement by an excited individual is an excited utterance
for purposes of the hearsay rule." Id. at 6. "The Rule 803(2) hearsay exception permits
excited utterances to be recounted, not the ongoing discourse of an excited individual.''"
Id. at 4.
Mrs. Hernandez responded in a manner appropriate of an upset woman in control
of her faculties. That is, she essentially took the officer on a guided tour of her home and
the alleged statements were made in a chronological order as opposed to the sporadic,
random statements indicative of someone lacking the ability to reason or reflect. "A
witness simply cannot recount a victim's entire story under the guise of the excited
utterance exception. The exception is much narrower than that, and is limited to truly
'spontaneous outbursts.'" Id. The trial judge ened by allowing just that to happen and this
Court should correct that oversight. None of Mrs. Hernandez's alleged statements were
excited utterances and none of them should have been admitted.
C The Statements were Unrelated to the Intervening Sources of
Excitement
The party seeking admission of statements alleged to be excited utterances bears
the burden of demonstrating that no intervening acts caused the declarant's alleged
excitement. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1. 4-5. Because addressing the police is, "itself a rather
sobering experience," this burden is especially high when the prosecution seeks to
introduce statements made in response to any question from an investigating officer. Id. at
5-6 & 6. n.7. In the present matter, the record and Mrs. Hernandez's affidavit provide
adequate proof that the disappearance of her son was the true source of Mrs. Hernandez's
excitement. Thus, the intervening excitement caused or at least contributed to Mrs.
Hernandez's appearance and demeanor. Since the statements in question were not related
to the intervening excitement, they are not admissible.
James. Mrs. Hernandez's son, testified that his mother called to him calmly and had
to do so twice before he tunicd his attention from the television. R. 121. James explained
that he was concerned that Mr. Heniandez might hit his mother, so he went to the
neighbor's and called the police. Id. While his testimony provides evidence that there
may have been problems in the past, it does nothing to indicate an existing problem. That
is, Mrs. Heniandez was not in such an extreme emotional state, that James was initially
concerned. In fact, she had to call him twice before he responded at all. James himself
said he had no idea what had happened and described his mother as calm when she called
him. Id.
It is not until Officer Wind's testimony that the record reflects any sort of
excitement from Mrs. Hernandez. R. 124. In fact, while James claims to understand that
his mother was hurt, he does not know how it happened. R. 121-22, While it appears
Mrs. Hernandez was injured before James left to call the police. James still describes her
as calm when she called to him. Thus, from the record, something other than the injury
must have caused Mrs. Hernandez's excitement. Perhaps an argument ensued while
James was awa\. or both parents became concerned about their son's whereabouts. In
fact, anything could have happened to upset Mrs. Hernandez's calm. The testimony at
tnal provides nothing to explain why Mrs. Hernandez was calm after the injury when
James left but became "excited, but not out of control" when she spoke with Officer Wind.
R. 124,
Thus, the Court must turn to Mrs. Hernandez's own words. She provided an
affidavit explaining why she became upset. She was not upset from a "mark" on her leg
that she believed, at the time, her husband may have caused. Rather, she became upset
because she did not know her son's whereabouts. See Briefof Appellant. Addendum B.
Such a reaction is a normal, human response. Any parent will explain the utter sense of
despair and the parade of horribles that occurs when a child is missing even for a few brief
moments. That Mrs. Heniandez was a bit upset when the police anived is no surprise. In
fact, if she were not upset, it would be more surprising. There is no other testimony or
evidence to explain Mrs. Hernandez's change in demeanor. Since an intervening event
caused Mrs. Hernandez's excitement, the statements admitted at trial did not relate to the
event and thus were inadmissible.
11. Admission of the Statements Violated the Federal and State
Confrontation Clauses.
A. Federal and State Confrontation
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution protect the accused's right to confront the witnesses against
him. This right is secured most effectively by cross-examination at trial. Appellant's
position here is quite simple. If the Court determines that the statements below were
improper hearsay, then Appellant's rights to confront the declarant by cross-examination
were violated. Appellant is not urging this Court to override the United State Supreme
( ourt, rather he asks the Court to simply apply the law as stated in the United States and
the Utah Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. VI and Utah Const, art, Tg!2.
The fact that the declarant, Mrs. Hernandez, was constitutionally unavailable
defeats Appellee's argument that Appellant could have called her to testify. Both cases
cited by Appellee make specific note of the fact that were an available declarant is present
in court or otherwise able to testify, a defendant who docs not call the declarant to testify
cannot later complain of a Confrontation Clause violation. See United States v. Rith, \u4
F3d 1323, 1335 (10"'Cir. 1999) ("Sixth Amendment guarantee ofan opportunity for
effective cross examination is satisfied where the defendant himself had the opportunity to
call the declarant as a witness.") and United State v. Jackson. 88 F.3d 845, 847, n,2 (10th
C.iL..].W>}(noting defendant failed to assert declarant's unavailability and could have
called declarant as a witness to preserve confrontation). Mr. Heniandez had no such
opportunity as the declarant. Mrs. Hernandez, was constitutionally unavailable,
B. State Confrontation
Hven assuming the statements were excited utterances and did not violate the
Federal Confrontation Clause, this Court can. and should determine that the rights secured
by the Utah Constitution's Confrontation Clause were violated. This Court has before it
precedential examples of the Utah Supreme Court's departures from the reasoning and
rulings of the United State Supreme Court. Further, the public policy endorsed bv the
Utah Constitution's unique spousal testimonial privilege and the case law interpreting that
privilege, support a departure from federal precedent.
Before expanding on this position. Appellant's view should be clear. It is not
Appellant's argument that this Court should adopt a blanket unavailability requirement
before a declarant's statements satisfy the Utah Confrontation Clause. Such a position
would prove fruitless to Appellant as the declarant in this case was unavailable due to a
constitutional privilege and legislative dictate. See Utah Code Ann. $77-36-2.7(5).
However, this Court is bound by the precedent of the Utah Supreme Court, In spite
of the federal court's willingness to limit confrontation clause rights when statements
satisfy hearsay exceptions, the Utah Supreme Court has held otherwise. "Simplv because
testimony of extrajudicial statements might be admissible under a hearsay exception does
not mean that those statements automatically pass constitutional muster." State v.
Moosman. 794 P.2d 474. 479-80 (Utah 1990). "The nght of a defendant to confront an
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accuser may bar evidence that might otherwise be admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule." State v. VillareaK 889 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1995V Both decisions are
significant as they post-date the federal rule. See RonnaMy v. United States. 483 IJ.S.
1? 1., 182-84H987j(recognizing that exceptions to hearsay rule generally satisfy
Confrontation Clause requirements).
While Villarcal dealt with a different exception, the proposition for which it stands
applies in this matter. Unlike the federal courts, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
more is required than simply satisfying an exception to the hearsay rule. Further, the same
concerns that lead courts to distrust a co-defendant's admission against penal interest are
implicated. That is. Mrs. Hernandez's alleged statements were made in a situation where
she may have intended to cast blame on her husband while minimizing or negating her
own conduct. The complexity inherent to any maniage; the little, or big, disagreements;
the mix of anger, joy, blame, shame; all of these factors contributed to the decision to
include the spousal testimonial privilege in the Utah Constitution. These factors likely
played a role in Mrs. Hernandez's alleged statements that afternoon.
The I ftah Supreme Court requires lower courts to evaluate the Confrontation
Clause's effect on the admissibility of hearsay statements with a two-factor test. First, if
the evidence is crucial to the prosecution's case, there is a greater need for confrontation.
Thus, there is a greater likelihood that admitting the statement will violate the
Confrontation Clause. Second, if the presence of the declarant would add probative value,
then confrontation is even more vital. See State v. Moosman. at 480. Ilere. the most
crucial evidence against Mr, Heniandez was the alleged statements. Without them, he
could not have been convicted. The statements were the only evidence indicating how-
Mrs. Hernandez received the mark on her leg. Further, Mrs. Hernandez's live testimony at
trial, though not possible, may have given the trial court a clearer picture of what actually
happened that afternoon. It is also possible that her live testimony may have made it
impossible for the trial court to decide what happened, thus favoring the presumption of
innocence.
In many cases alleging domestic violence, the case will come down to "he-said,
she-said." A rule that allows police, prosecutor and judge to convict defendants without a
proper opportunity to weigh the alleged victim's credibility, violates notions of fair play
and truth-seeking. Such a rule also violates the intent of the founders of this state in
creating an absolute, testimonial privilege for spouses akin to the privilege against self-
incrimination, rather than a mere communication privilege. See State v. Robertson. 932
P.2d 1219. 1217 (Utah 1997)(there is a "natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to
compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation.").
Such concerns lead the Utah Supreme Court to depart from the path chosen by the
United States Supreme Court. Utah, and a few other states, has diverged and chosen the
path less traveled by requiring an additional check. See State v. Ortiz. 845 P.2d 547
fHaw. 1993)('refusing to admit excited utterance without showing of unavailability); State
v. Storch. 612 N.Ei,2d 305. 313 (Ohio 1993)(fmding that White decision "provides less
protection" of Federal Confrontation Clause as traditionally construed and under State
Confrontation Clause). Utah has essentially held that more than just reliability is at issue;
there is also some notion of simple fairness. If the crucial element of the prosecution's
case is a hearsay statement, Utah law recognizes an increased concent for confrontation.
5^e State v. Moosman, at 480. Where confrontation is impossible due to declarant's
unavailability, the statements must be deemed inadmissible unless other indicia of
reliability exist. See State v. Moosman, at 479-481.
If Mrs. Hernandez's statements were indeed excited utterances, then under the logic
of White and State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236. 240 (Utah 1995), the indicia of reliability are
sufficient. However, this does not address the fundamental concent addressed by the first
prong of Moosman. That is, the crucial part of the prosecution's case was Mrs.
Hernandez's alleged statements.
[W]hen [out-of-court statements are] the only source for the central
allegation of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at
all. meet the minimal requirements of admissibility, we do not believe
that a substantial factual basis as to each element of the crime
providing support for the conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt has been offered by the Government.
State v, Ramsey. 782 P.2d 480. 484 (Utah 1989) quoting United States v. Orrico. 599 F.2d
JJ.3_1^LCjlJ_979J. The alleged statements where crucial to the prosecution and provided
the sole source of support for the allegation against Mr. Hernandez. Accordingly, this
Court should follow the precedent and policy outlined by the Utah Supreme Court and
hold that Mr. Hernandez's Utah State Constitution Confrontation Clause rights were
violated.
CONCLUSION
The statements admitted at trial were not excited utterances and thus were
improperly admitted. When admitted, there was little or no evidence that a startling event
had occurred. Furthermore, the statements admitted were not made while the declarant
was under the stress or excitement of any alleged excitement. Rather, the statements were
a complete narrative ofalleged events, made in response to police questioning, made by an
adult woman with no real signs ofinjury, from the safety ofher own home. Finally, the
statement had little or nothing to do with the true source of the declarant's upset
demeanor. That is, she was upset over a missing child, not an alleged incident which
caused her to do little more than calmly address her son. Thus, the statements do not meet
any of the tests laid out to qualify as excited utterance. This Court should hold the
admission of those statements was error and overturn Mr. Hernandez's conviction.
Additionally, admission of the statements violated Mr. Hernandez's right to
confront the witness against him. Since the statements were not excited utterances, both
the Federal and State Constitutions require that Mr. Hernandez have been given the right
to confront his accuser. This right was not adequately protected by the trial court and this
Court should recognize that error.
Hven assuming the statements were excited utterances, their admission violated the
Confrontation Clause as interpreted and applied by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah
Court's interpretation supports the notion that Utah has a different standard when
analyzing the Confrontation Clause. Since confrontation has been in-anted additional
protections under Utah law, this protection must stem from the Utah Constitution. This
Court should hold as much, and apply the test laid down by the Utah Supreme Court.
Upon doing so, the Court will find that the statements in question were indeed crucial to
the prosecution's case, and thus, defendant's right to confront the declarant was violated.
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